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Two years ago, large-scale protests in Sudan led to the ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir and the establishment of a semi-military and semi-civilian transitional government. Today, this “Chimera” government is still working hard to show the Sudanese people that it can eliminate the destruction caused by Bashir’s authoritarian regime, activate the country’s dying economy, and open the way for true democratic governance.
About six months after Abdalla Hamdok became prime minister, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Sudan, and Sudan has since fallen into recession. As the poverty rate soared, the government’s civilian departments found themselves unable to respond effectively to this global public health emergency. A series of crises in diplomatic relations made the government’s Sisyphian task of stabilizing the country more difficult.
Currently, the country is involved in the tug-of-war between Egypt and Ethiopia over the restoration of the dam in Ethiopia, and it is also responding to the effects of the Tigray riots. Peace with Israel in exchange for being removed from the list of countries supporting terrorism cost Sudan a heavy price.
At the same time, the country is facing countless domestic crises-floods, locusts and conflicts, as well as many obstacles caused by stubborn security services. Through all this, the government has failed to prove to the public that it has a specific plan and detailed policy plan to get Sudan out of the multifaceted crisis it is in.
Since taking office in September 2019, Prime Minister Hamdok’s main focus has been to rebuild Sudan’s position on the international stage, and he has undoubtedly made significant progress in this area. A few months after taking office, Hamdock made official visits to Brussels and Washington, which was the first visit by a Sudanese politician in decades.
In addition, during the International Conference on Sudan in Paris in May, the member states of the International Monetary Fund agreed to pay off Sudan’s debt to the institution so that it could obtain a $50 billion foreign debt relief. However, as the Sudanese economist Hafez Ibrahim recently quipped, “debt relief is only related to the creditors’ books and the U.S. dollar”. In fact, debt relief and international recognition as a measure of success have little meaning for those who cannot buy basic goods such as food and fuel.
Sudan’s political elite should carefully study the ongoing Afghan crisis and understand that placing international support above domestic demand and over-reliance on the international community may pave the way for the revival of fundamentalists who triumphantly praise liberal democracy. fail.
Public support weakened
Since the results achieved after the revolution did not penetrate the masses, for a period of time, there has been a clear sense of despair on the streets of Sudan.
The delay in the establishment of the parliament, Hamdock’s perceived weakness in putting pressure on the military to fully participate in the transition process, rising unemployment and deepening poverty, coupled with the continued public lack of confidence in the country’s political process, have brought Sudan closer to collapse the edge of.
Since last year, young people frustrated by lack of choice and improved lives have been protesting across the country. Some people even blocked the main artery of Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, to show the government and the public the depth of their pain.
These protests come as the Resistance Committee (the pillar of the 2018 revolution) and others in civil society are discussing whether a new revolution is needed or whether reforms to the current setup are sufficient to avoid a resurgence of Islamists. This ongoing discussion may be the only thing that buys time for the government and keeps protests under control.
The military branch of the government reluctantly assumed some public relations responsibilities and verbally responded to calls for a rapid democratic transition. However, they have not shown that they are willing to truly commit to a process that will see their share of the state budget and their share of power drastically decrease. Although there have been some obvious positive changes in certain areas of Sudan’s political and social fields, even after the illegitimate wealth of some former regime leaders was confiscated, there has been no major change in who owns most of the financial capital.
However, slow progress is not the only reason behind the growing public criticism and distrust of civilian government. Hamdok’s apparent reluctance to communicate and build relationships with the public also contributed to this situation. In fact, during the ups and downs of the transition period, few people saw or heard the voice of the Prime Minister, except for a small number of consultants and staff. Unlike most revolutionary governments in history, the Sudanese government did not try to present itself as an important part or protector of the revolution, nor did it try to turn its leader into a revolutionary icon.
Hamdok may have received more public support after his appointment than any Sudanese leader in history. Now, after months of not involving the public in his plans or their pain, he is facing unprecedented public outrage. In fact, during the public protests held on June 3 and June 30 to commemorate the second anniversary of the Khartoum massacre and the largest revolutionary demonstration, the crowd repeatedly called for Hamdok to resign.
The civilians in the government did not spend enough time reminding everyone that Bashir’s military regime has sowed the seeds for the current painful period and caused the prime minister to be blamed. Therefore, for some people, the revolution is not over, or worse, it has not happened.
Broadly speaking, so far, the civil service department of the government has failed to achieve four key goals: to consolidate domestic consensus, coordinate governance between different partners, fully fill capacity gaps, and communicate effectively with the public. Now, the continued public dissatisfaction with the pace of change may change the policy direction of this administration. The recent anger on the streets, with rising foreign exchange rates and sharply rising inflation rates—by the way, the motivation that led to Bashir’s step down—has prompted Hamdock to consider a change in strategy.
Turn page?
Hamdok faces a wave of opposition: from the public, the military, members of the former regime, and a wide range of Islamists who continue to inject themselves into the political process in different forms. Then came the party elite and the leadership of the rebel movement. It is an untenable policy to continue to give favors and positions to all these as the foundation of nation-building.
Therefore, on June 22, Hamdok announced a new initiative to “unite and guide the various factions in Sudan through the fragile transition.” In the public statement, he first recognized that the transformation was in crisis, and then outlined a proposal to get it back on track.
Hamdok said his initiative aims to reform the military and ensure that armed groups, including the powerful paramilitary rapid support force (RSF), are fully integrated into the armed forces. He also announced that through this measure, the disintegration of the remnants of Bashir’s regime, the response to the economic crisis and the establishment of a transitional legislature will become his government’s new priorities.
Although some senior international officials praised Hamdok’s initiative, the media paid relatively little attention to the move, and most Sudanese observers did not know what to do. In fact, to most people, the Prime Minister’s new priorities sound like nothing more than a vague retelling of the priorities announced by his government during its heyday in September 2019: forming a parliament, repairing the economy, bringing peace and disintegrating Pakistan. Hill regime.
However, supporters see this new move as a civilian coup, aimed at retaking the country and realigning the trajectory of the transition. Perhaps the most significant change in direction brought about by this initiative so far is security sector reform.
Through his new initiative, Hamdock not only put pressure on the military branch of the government to pull the country back from the cliff of civil war, but he also put the burden of any security sector reform where it belongs: armed Group, official otherwise.
He publicly challenged the dominant military actors to rule their members and their ambitions. This is undoubtedly a departure from Hamdock’s previous strategy. Although it is ambitious and may prove to be effective, it may also be counterproductive.
The armed groups are likely to take a step back, let the chaos fill the vacuum, and then swoop in to regain control. One thing Hamdock should keep in mind is that well-intentioned proposals and appeals are unlikely to succeed without a clearly defined and well-communicated action plan.
In Sudan, after 30 years of dictatorship, the young democracy is still fragile, which is understandable. Many people still believe that the military—rather than elected civilian leaders—is better suited to show the way for the country. In addition, many people believe that Islam provides the necessary blueprint for governance, with little need for democratization.
It remains to be seen whether Hamdok’s initiative can successfully reverse Sudan’s transformation. But less than two years before the planned election, his time is running out.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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