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On August 26, two suicide bombers carried out an evacuation operation at Kabul Airport, killing 72 Afghans and 13 US troops. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of ISIL, claimed responsibility for this brutal attack, thus putting itself under the spotlight of the international media.
Although foreign media has only started to pay attention to this group, ISKP has been intimidating Afghans since 2015 and will continue to do so after the withdrawal of US troops on August 31.
There are two aspects to this attack that need to be considered. First, ISKP attacked the airport mainly to discredit its rival, the Taliban, which is another escalation of the greater conflict between Sunni extremist armed groups. Secondly, ISKP made it clear that it will be difficult for the Taliban to fulfill their promises to ensure the safety of civilians, especially women and minorities under its rule.
Conflict between Sunni non-state actors
The emergence of the Islamic State (an umbrella organization including ISKP) is usually attributed to sectarian dynamics and Sunni-Shia conflicts from the Arab world to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The problem with blaming the violent conflict in this area on the tension between the two sects is that it ignores how long and bloody armed groups have instigated internal Sunni conflicts.
ISIL was formed by defectors from Al-Qaida in Syria in 2014, who subsequently attacked their parent organization and its Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. ISKP is mainly composed of Taliban defectors in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2015, and then they continue to attack the Afghan branch. In both cases, the defectors felt that their previous organization was not extreme or firm enough to attack Sunni compatriots who they thought were deviant or Shia Muslims.
In essence, ISIL and its affiliates are on the one hand, and the conflict between Al-Qaida and the Taliban on the other, represents the Sunni internal conflict that is often overlooked among extremist groups. Both Syria and Afghanistan are insecure areas, leading to the formation of multiple extremist non-state actors, mainly religious warlords. Because these non-state actors are so close ideologically, as long as other competitors exist, their legitimacy will be threatened and must be eliminated immediately. Defeating their violent rivals can gain a monopoly on the jihadist narrative and the benefits of recruits.
With the withdrawal of the United States, ISKP is preparing to clashed with the Taliban. Although the number of ISKP has been reduced to 2,000, it can still challenge the legitimacy of an estimated 60,000 powerful Taliban. As its forces are scattered throughout Afghanistan, the Taliban will be particularly vulnerable to the violent and terrorist tactics of its division.
Anti-Shia and security challenges
The roots of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be traced back to the serious Deobandi School, which is a South Asian Islamic Revival Movement. In the 1980s, the Sipah-e-Sahaba organization was established in Pakistan, separated from the main Deobandi movement and focused mainly on anti-Shia platforms. Another group called Lashkar-e-Jhangvi split from the group in the 1990s, claiming that its parent group deviated from the original anti-Shia platform. The defectors of the organization later joined the IKSP and were attracted by its more brutal anti-Shia movement.
The most violent behaviors of these groups are the Hazaras of the Shiite minority living in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The community has historically been the victim of different Afghan rulers, the most famous being Abdurrahman Khan, who tried to eradicate it completely in the 1890s.
A century later, this community suffered violence when the Taliban tried to establish rule over Afghanistan. In 1998, an armed group massacred thousands of Hazaras in Mazar-e-Sharif in retaliation for killing its fighters after a failed attempt to seize the city the previous year.
After the emergence of ISKP, the Hazara community became one of its main targets. Some of the most shameless attacks included the massacre in a maternity hospital in Kabul’s Shiite Muslim-majority area in May 2020, which killed more than 20 people, including newborns and mothers. A year later, in May 2021, it launched an attack on a school in the same area, killing at least 90 people, most of them female students.
It is not accurate to call it a “sectarian conflict” because it implies equality between the two parties. It also confuses racism and anti-Shia sentiment leading to attacks on the community, which has long been mistakenly considered by other ethnic groups to be “non-indigenous” in Afghanistan.
This is also reflected in the fact that the Afghan government backed by the United States has never prioritized the safety of the Hazaras. In fact, some of its members are known for discriminating against the community.
Taliban leaders have repeatedly stated that the rights of ethnic minorities and women will be protected. However, it remains to be seen whether leaders can control their fighters and discipline them when they violate orders.
To be sure, it will be difficult for the Taliban to control ISKP and eliminate its attraction to more extremists in Afghan society and its own ranks.
As for the United States, the bloody attack on August 26 will force the Biden administration to retaliate, which will eventually complicate the plan for a complete withdrawal and may even damage the relationship with the Taliban itself.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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