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In August 1991, the Communist Party hardliners attempted to launch a military coup in Moscow, which triggered a democratic revolution and triggered the collapse of the Soviet system. The coupist’s residence in Crimea blocked the reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and transported the tank into Moscow. However, under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Soviet Republic (which was part of the Soviet Union at the time), thousands of Muscovites came to the defense of the Russian parliament. The elite troops refused to rush into the building, and eventually the army turned to Yeltsin’s side.
Thirty years later, Russia finds itself at the end of a historical cycle that began when its people rose up against a regime in which moral and economic bankruptcy was raised.
The two Russias, one is Russia in 1991, and the other is the Russia we observe today. They feel far apart from each other in terms of political, economic reality, or social dynamics. In 1991, under Yeltsin’s leadership, Russia was very keen to embrace democracy and the West. Public protests against communism have attracted hundreds of thousands of people, and the size of these groups is still unmatched by recent opposition gatherings.
The largest of these large-scale demonstrations (arguably the largest in Russian history) was held in January 1991. This is a protest against the Soviet authorities’ attempt to suppress the Lithuanian independence movement. A week ago, Yeltsin went to Tallinn and signed treaties with the three Baltic countries, recognizing their sovereignty on behalf of the Russian Soviet Republic. He made this move in contempt for Soviet leader Gorbachev, who is still trying to keep the Soviet Union intact.
At that time, Yeltsin’s Russia was one of the main driving forces that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was one of the first Soviet republics to declare that its sovereignty and laws override Soviet legislation on its territory. At the end of 1991, Yeltsin and the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine jointly announced the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Sixteen years later, his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin, declared that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical disaster in the United States.” [20th] century”.
In 1991, from a Western perspective, this country was an ideal Russia. It is more free than ever, but it is a desperate freedom. The population is poor, the infrastructure is dilapidated, and the risk of famine is very high. This is a fantasy. To make matters worse, what is coming is a civil war, similar to the civil war that broke out in Yugoslavia, but both potential warring parties can use nuclear weapons.
Over the next 30 years, Russia’s nascent democracy slowly degraded. It first evolved into the kind of mixed semi-autocratic regime we can see in Hungary today, and then sank into the swamp of mature authoritarianism. But at the same time as these unfortunate developments, its economy grew rapidly in the first ten years of Putin’s rule, and the rapid modernization process began, especially the urban environment and transportation, which continue today. Russia in 2021 is a safer, more comfortable, affluent and modern place to live than in 1991.
The general doom and pessimistic analysis of Russia often overlooks the tremendous progress that the country and society have made in the past 30 years. The biggest paradox of Putin’s regime is that, despite the deteriorating politics, the cultural and social structure runs counter to the regime.
In short, Russia has never been as westernized and modernized as it is now in the past 100 years. Indeed, without rampant corruption and more careful handling of oil and gas revenues, the lives of Russians could be much better than they are now. But the standard of living is comparable to that of poorer EU countries, and it is still the best life experience for Russians of all ages.
As great political thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama emphasized, political development has never been linear or straightforward. Putin’s authoritarianism suppressed the opposition and independent media, while also creating a safer space for millions of people to improve their private lives and pursue happiness. Although it sounds mediocre, money gives freedom, so compared to the politically free but turbulent 1990s, many Russians feel more free in lifestyle choices, careers, and travel.
A better life leads to a more mature public discourse. Post-traumatic psychosis was the most distinctive feature of Russian society in the 1990s. It gave way to a more reflective attitude towards life and more skilled interpersonal communication. The outbursts of outrageous harshness, unfounded anger, and robbery—the hallmarks of Soviet society in the 1990s, reflected in the movies and music of the time—have disappeared.
A fledgling charity and volunteer department, followed by the rise of the 2011-12 winter protests, helped overcome the extreme atomization that plagued the post-totalitarian society. As evidenced by the rise of the Alexei Navalny movement, Russian society continued to mature in the next few years, and the regime began to enter its old age, reminiscent of the Soviet old-age rule in the 1980s.
The anniversary of the Russian Democratic Revolution took place against the backdrop of an unprecedented wave of repression, which was launched by the Kremlin on the eve of the parliamentary elections held in September. Almost every day there are news reports of political activists and independent journalists being arrested, sentenced, declared “foreign agents” or forced into exile. By terrorizing opponents, the Putin government exposed its fear of a mature society that is increasingly hostile to the Kremlin.
All this shows that Russia is the complete opposite of hopeless situations. It has entered a turbulent period because society has exceeded the scope provided by the regime. It used to be an organic one and now needs to be changed.
Putin’s last resort is to strengthen confrontation with the West, which provides him with what political scientists call confrontational legitimization. He counted on the West to make a serious mistake in the relentless and often inadvertent expansion of the former Soviet Union-a mistake that would unite the Russians with him, just as the Soviets united around Joseph Stalin, facing survival during World War II. threat.
But so far, Putin has not succeeded in this regard, despite his attempts to confront the Ukraine issue as a theme in this campaign. In fact, the Russians have returned to the Western friendly model since the 1990s. A recent public opinion survey showed that 63% of people have a positive attitude towards Western countries, and only 24% have a negative attitude towards the West.
Putin may also hope that the West will take measures to contain and isolate Russia-facts have shown that this policy can extend the life of the most outdated regimes such as North Korea and Cuba. When life is difficult, people oppose a regime with less resources, and the leaders of this regime can still enjoy the luxurious lifestyle as before.
But leaving aside Western concerns about improper handling of this crisis, doom and pessimism seem to be misplaced. In 1991, there were also quite a few. But then the August Revolution took place, and many people still think it is a miracle. In fact, the Russian people’s ability to surprise themselves and the regime that oppresses them should not be underestimated.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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