[ad_1]
The author is a researcher in the Arabian Gulf countries. She has a Ph.D. Government and International Affairs at Durham University. In her research, she examines the foreign policy, security strategy and political culture of GCC countries. Dogan-Akkas also covers the involvement of GCC countries in the war in Yemen and Turkey’s relationship with the GCC.
istanbul
Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, has appointed his son Sheikh Khalid bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan is Crown Prince. However, changes in the UAE bureaucracy and Abu Dhabi’s political elite did not stop at the de facto rule of succession – father to son.
Sheikh Mohammed’s 3 brothers from the “Bani Fatima Block” were appointed to different positions, one of which was a newly invented position: Vice President of the UAE. Starting with one of the most controversial, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, currently Manchester City boss, was elevated to the post of vice-president of the UAE, which is traditionally held under the Emir of Dubai. Al Maktoum, a position held under the federal rule of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. Shaikh Mansour and his father-in-law, Shaikh Al Maktoum, will share this article, which brings to the fore the discussion surrounding further centralization in the UAE. In Sheikh Mohammed’s mid-Ramadan transformation, Sheikh Tanu and Sheikh Haza were named deputy rulers of Abu Dhabi.
The initial reaction was to interpret the landmark decisions as a step towards further centralizing power in Sheikh Mohammed’s hands, including his own son and his brother from the “Bani Fatima Block” to the circle of power.
Dr Mira Al Hussein, a Cambridge alumnus and currently an Alwaleed Early Career Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, interprets the changes as revealing realities on the ground. She said: “The federation as we have traditionally known it has ceased to exist for a long time. Abu Dhabi does not need a formal appointment to confirm this; it is clear that every aspect of governance is centralized to the extent that our passports are no longer governed by Issued by our respective emirates, but have to go through a central system for issuance.”
Does centralization benefit citizens?
If this is the case, would citizens benefit more if the UAE moved to a de facto central governance structure revolving around Abu Dhabi’s political elite? Al Hussein aptly offers a pragmatic perspective on the division of labor between the citizens and the seven emirates: “From the logic of the state, maintaining a federation seems rather expensive. Not long ago, people were talking about Abu Dhabi being bearing the financial burden of the union, And also the other emirates should play a role and contribute. The other emirates, although limited in natural resources, also contribute in kind, though not financially. The manpower comes from the northern emirates, and the army consists mostly of citizens of the northern emirates. Therefore, The idea that other emirates should contribute to the federal budget is not aimed at the citizens, but at the ruling elites of these emirates, who are increasingly seen as a burden on the state budget, while Abu Dhabi is an economic and political powerhouse.”
What Al Hussein defines is an established rentier system, as the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has endured for decades, but still displays the unique characteristics of federal rule. There are two forms of rentierism in the UAE. The exchange of services and benefits between the state and its citizens is the first and traditional definition. The second rentier approach is for the ruling elites of the seven emirates to recognize Abu Dhabi’s power in exchange for economic and security interests for them and their citizens and the international prestige of the UAE brand. Once centralization was unavoidable and practical, Hussain spoke of the importance of mobility for both citizens and ruling elites. She said: “I think those who deny the possibility of uniting the UAE under one ruling family are postponing an uncomfortable conversation. Over time, maintaining figurehead leaders will prove costly and Abu Dhabi will have no The obligation to maintain the status quo as legislative, executive and judicial powers and the economy are all the prerogative of the central government. I think over time we may see bolder and more public moves to affirm the federation of Abu Dhabi and its ruling family This will be especially evident in the succession of what happened in Dubai.”
The death of federalism or the division of roles?
Another common way of interpreting changes in the UAE bureaucracy does not describe the UAE’s form of governance as the death of the federal system. Instead, as Dr Khalifa Al Suwaidi from the Anwar Gargash School of Diplomacy shared his view on Twitter, “It’s more about creating a division of roles within a technocratic system”. Al Suwaidi defined the concentration of power around Abu Dhabi’s political elite as an advantage that all Emiratis would benefit economically, as more integration would lead to economic growth. Al Suwaidi also disagreed with the definition of Emiratis as “passive and lacking agency” to these changes, arguing that they participate in these processes by demonstrating their “general acceptance and agreement”.
The role or acceptance of citizens is an area of contention, as the central focus is an authoritarian state with tribal mechanics, despite an overt and progressive liberal policy in social and economic activity. If these bureaucratic changes and changing social realities are based on “flexible governance,” as Sheikh Al Maktoum puts it, even if they are entirely engineered by political elites, their responses at the social level will how? This is where enhanced national identity meets centralized governance.
The Effects of Centralization: Steps to Top-Down Nationalism
I asked Hussain if she thought the emirate’s nationalism and nationalist support were the same as their attitude towards Sheikh Mohammed’s centralization. She replied: “In the past, the UAE University, the country’s first higher education institution, brought together students from different emirates and served as a meeting place in which the Emirati identity was articulated and rehearsed. The establishment of the new institution and the local campus made the university The introduction of conscription into conscription provides a new platform for assembly where a cohesive UAE identity can be rehearsed within the context of nationalism, patriotism and productive citizenship.
Centralizing power around the idea of “Emirati nation” and Emirati identity through institutions and rituals could help Sheikh Mohammed ease this bureaucratic process while society adapts to change. This is a state-led, top-down construction of national identity, but it can help political elites brand central governance around a nationalist narrative of being “Emirati”. In other words, more centralized rule can be accompanied by a more nationalist official narrative to persuade the masses, but this is not the will or consent of the masses. Sacrifice for the country in overseas wars such as Yemen, introduction of national military service, massive national day celebrations and heritage festivals, concept of martyrs in the war in Yemen, declaration of remembrance days, and establishment of more national museums and sites such as Wahat Al Karama The memorial is an example of official attempts to promote Emirati identity and achieve a unified nationalism across 7 different sets of rules. Sheikh Mohammed’s rising leadership around centralization is thus closely linked to the future Emirati identity.
* The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu’s editorial policy.
[ad_2]
Source link