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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar played an active role in the 2011 military campaign to topple Gaddafi.Since then, Abu Dhabi and Qatar doha Attitudes toward Libya have changed dramatically, but have always been characterized by competition and aggressive foreign policies aimed at each other’s efforts, allies and proxies in Libya.
After Gaddafi was overthrown, the rivalry between Qatar and the UAE in Libya went through a stage of competing aggressive policies in Libya. This includes targeted media campaigns, funding of various Libyan media and social media pages, use of Twitter and Facebook bots, and sometimes even direct military and financial support to their Libyan proxies and allies.
Notably, Qatar and the UAE have taken two very different approaches to the alliance they seek to build in Libya. Qatar is aligned with Islamist and hardline revolutionary trends, while the UAE is aligned with nationalist and non-Islamist trends.
Islamists and Nationalists
Between 2011 and 2014, Qatar gained the upper hand in Libya, with allies and proxies spread across the country through military and political alliances. Doha’s allies prevailed in the National Transitional Council (NTC) and later the National Congress (GNC), although the National Forces coalition led by the late Mahmoud Jibril won the popular vote by about 50%. The seats were allocated to political party lists in the 2012 elections.
On the other hand, the UAE’s allies have suffered setback after setback during this period. That changed in 2014 when Khalifa Hifter became Abu Dhabi’s main ally in Libya, and the balance of power began to favor the UAE following the launch of Operation Dignity in eastern Libya. By 2017, the Libyan National Army (LNA) had taken control of Benghazi and Derna, and Qatar’s Islamist allies in both cities were defeated. In Tripoli, GNC factions opposed to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA, or Skhirat Agreement) led by Nuri Abu Sahmain and the National Salvation Government led by Khalifa al-Ghwell were driven out of Tripoli by the Pro-National Agreement Government (GNA) armed groups in Tripoli.
As a result of this shift, many Islamic figures, including Libyan Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Gheryani and former leaders of Libyan Islamic groups Khalid al-Sharif and Abdulhakim Belhaj, had to flee Libya in 2016 Live between Qatar and Turkey. At this point, the UAE and its allies in Libya are emboldened, and through direct mediation between Fayez al-Sarraj and Hifter, the UAE seeks to find a way to ensure that its allies can control Tripoli. However, the 2019 Abu Dhabi meeting and subsequent agreement between Sarraj and Haftar failed due to opposition from armed groups in Tripoli, with the UAE ultimately leading the way in backing Haftar’s war to control the capital Tripoli’s decision. This has gone too far for the UAE and the strategy has backfired as it has caused enormous reputational damage to Abu Dhabi both on the international stage and locally.In addition, its main ally, the Hifter, was militarily attacked by turkey and forces allied with it in Tripoli and Misrata. The end of the war in 2020 marks the beginning of a shift in the UAE’s strategy in Libya, to a more nuanced and transactional one that is being rapidly implemented in 2021 and 2022.
UAE recalibrates after 2020
After the end of the 2020 battle for Tripoli and the defeat of the LNA, the UAE paused and readjusted its attitude towards Libya. In 2020, the UAE assesses that its years of investment in building relationships and influence networks from eastern Libya to Egypt, which successfully mediated in May 2020 between Agila Saleh and Kazakhstan, have been lost. The truce between Hifter, which has taken the lead politically and diplomatically, is worrisome for eastern participation. Emiratis were then active in the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and managed to use their personal connections with Libyan stakeholders as well as commercial diplomacy to achieve what they could not achieve by supporting the LNA’s military operations in Libya in 2019, The UAE, at odds with its close allies in France and Egypt, chose to support the Dbeibah-Menfi list in Geneva, against the Bashagha-Saleh list backed by Paris and Cairo.
#libia– 2022 Closing Ceremony #low noise amplifier The 106th Brigade, led by its commander Brigadier General Khaled Haftar.
the 106th Brigade, by its size, resource allocation, combined arms (including dedicated air units), and of course commander, is being transformed into an army within an “army” pic.twitter.com/fcgiWx7DxR— Oded Berkowitz (@Oded121351) January 26, 2023
Although the Qataris have backed the Dbeibah-Menfi list in Geneva and are largely in line with Turkey in terms of the LPDF result, they are against Abdul Hamid Dbeibah at diatomite. Indeed, the Emiratis gained significant influence in Tripoli and built relationships with key security interlocutors such as the current acting interior minister, Emad al-Trabulsi, and armed groups there, such as the Support and Stabilization Group led by Ghnewa al-Kikli and the 301st Brigade, led by Abdulsalam Zubi, and secured the appointment of Farhat Bengdara as the top leader of the national oil company to increase their chances of gaining a lucrative share of Libya’s energy sector – a deal they have already reaped. Still, Qataris are pleased to see Libya’s longtime ally displaced since 2016 return and regain a foothold in Tripoli.
In response to Abu Dhabi’s aggressive approach in Tripoli, Doha has been building ties in eastern Libya, including with figures within the LNA such as Hifter’s son Belgasim and senior LNA officials who supported the February 17 revolution, as well as Aji, the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives. Rasaleh and a growing number of members of the House of Representatives. The observer for Libya reported on these meetings.
Although aggression in Libya has decreased significantly since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in 2020, the sources of ideological tension and strategic competition between the UAE and Qatar in Libya remain. Qatar continues to adopt a pro-Arab Spring and pro-Islamist agenda in its dealings with Libya.As for the UAE, despite recalibrating its approach in Libya, the overall strategic perspective remains the same.
Even when Abu Dhabi tried to diversify its partnerships away from Hifter and LNA, they chose to build bridges and relationships with former regime figures such as Dbeibah and even Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, whose top aides lived mainly in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. A coalition of directions aligned with the UAE’s post-2011 anti-Islamist and anti-hardline revolutionary stance.Furthermore, the UAE is trying to position itself as an important partner for Cairo in Tripoli, but at the same time Abu Dhabi is also positioning itself as the gatekeeper in eastern Libya, as far as Ankara was noticed, Given Turkey’s strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are geographically linked to the coastal areas of the eastern cities of Derna and Tobruk, with which Turkey claims maritime borders.
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